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In the Matter of 
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) 
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__________________________ ) 
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STATEMENTS OF THE CASE 
The issues raised by the Appellant are entirely 
procedural in nature. The sole issue is whether a District 
Court Judge has the authority to renew prior judgments by 
incorporating them into a subsequent judgment. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The order of the Honorable Jay E. Banks of Sep-
tember 8, 1977 was that the prior judgment of February 4, 
1970 would not be reincorporated into a new judgment for child 
support arrearages which had incurred after February 4, 1970. 
Judge Banks advised the Respondent that she would have to col-
lect the support arrearages from the Appellant and that any child 
support arrearages which had accrued since February of 1970 would 
be part of a new judgment. Respondent, therefore, filed a new 
complaint and served Appellant personally with summons and 
complaint before the eight (8) year limitation period had run. 
Appellant failed to answer the complaint and Respondent properly 
took default judgment to renew the February 4, 1970 judgment. 
The Honorable G. Hal Taylor properly denied Appellant's 
motion to set aside the default judgment which, in effect, re-
newed the February 4, 1970 judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent was awarded a decree of divorce from the 
Appellant on April 15, 1959 in the Third Judicial District Court. 
The decree required Appellant to pay Respondent the sum of $50.00 
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per month per child as child support and further ordered the 
Appellant to pay the Respondent the sum of $50.00 per month as 
alimony. Respondent brought an order to show cause proceeding 
against Appellant for the nonpayment of past due support pay-
ments. Judge Bryant H. Croft heard the matter on May 5, 1966 
and entered judgment in favor of the Respondent for the sum of 
$300.00 for past due support payments, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of eight per cent per annum on May 9, 1966. 
Appellant was further ordered to continue to make the payments 
of $100.00 per month to the Respondent for and on behalf of 
the two minor children. Respondent brought a further order to 
show cause proceeding against Appellant for additional nonpayment 
of support and the matter was heard on November 7, 1966 before 
the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson. Judge Anderson entered a judgment 
against the Appellant for the sum of $500.00 for past due support, 
together with interest thereon at the rate of eight percent per 
annum on November 21, 1966. Respondent filed an additional order 
to show cause proceeding for additional support due and the matter 
was heard before the Honorable Emmett H. Brown on February 2, 1970. 
Judge Brown assigned a judgment for delinquent alimony and sup~ort, 
attorney fees and order, dated February 4, 1970. As part of the 
order, Respondent was awarded judgment in the sum of $11,705.00 
representing the total amount by which Appellant was delinquent 
in alimony and support payments from April of 1959 through Decem-
ber 31, 1969, excluding interest and including all prior judgments 
entered during that time. 
Respondent brought an order to show cause proceeding 
against Appellant for nonpayment of support, dental expenses, 
-2-
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and other items which matters were heard before the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft on February 17, 1976. The Appellant was re-
presented by Thomas A. Jones at that hearing and the Appellant 
stipulated in open court to the judgment of February 4, 1970 for 
the child support arrearages of $11,705.00. He further stipulated 
to pay ongoing support, the outstanding dental expenses for the 
minor children, and other items. An order incorporating these 
items was signed by Judge Croft to this effect on March 30, 1976. 
Respondent filed an order to show cause in re declaration of 
contempt against Appellant for additional delinquent support pay-
ments, nonpayment of the dental expenses and other items. The 
matter was heard initially before the Honorable Jay E. Banks on 
April 25, 1977. Judge Banks awarded the Respondent $150.00 for 
support arrearages, $374.98 for dental expenses, etc. Judge Ban~· 
order in regard to paragraph 2 entered in September of 1977 stated 
that no judgment would be granted on judgments or arrearages here-
tofore entered. Judge Banks intended by this order that he would 
not incorporate the prior judgment of February 4, 1970 for the 
sum of $11,705.00 into his judgment, and, therefore, granted 
judgment of $150.00 for child support arrearages for the sum 
due and owing since Februaryof 1970. Judge Banks did not prevent 
the Respondent from renewing her judgment against the Appellant 
for $11,705.00 entered on February 4, 1970. 
Respondent filed a complaint to renew the judgment 
of February 4, 1970 on March 15, 1977 under Civil No. 241218 
and personally served the Appellant with a copy of the complaint 
and summons on April 18, 1977. The Appellant failed to respond 
.-3-
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to the complaint within twenty days and the Respondent took 
default judgment on July 6, 1977, which, in effect, renewed her 
former judgment against the Appellant. The Appellant was 
allowed two and one half months to answer Respondent's complaint 
and failed to do so before the Respondent took default judgment. 
Appellant moved ~he court to set aside the default judgment of 
the Respondent which renewed the February 4, 1970 judgment of 
$11,705.00. The matter was heard on July 6, 1978 before the 
Honorable G. Hal Taylor. Judge Taylor advised Appellant's counsel 
that his answer admitted the allegations set forth in the 
Respondent's complaint on March 15, 1977 and that the Appellant 
has no affirmative defenses. Judge Taylor denied the Appellant's 
motion leaving the Respondent's judgment of July 6, 1977 in full 
force and effect. The only valid defense which Appellant could 
have raised to the Respondent's complaint would have been proof 
of payment which was obviously indefensable by Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the decision of July 6, 1978 
of Judge G. Hal Taylor affirmed, wherein Judge Taylor denied 
the Appellant's motion to set aside default judgment. Respondent 
further requests the finding of this court that the judgment of 
July 6, 1977 was the proper renewal of a former judgment dated 
February 4, 1970. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT PROPERLY RENEWED THE 
JUDGMENT OF FEBRUARY 4, 1970 WITH-
IN THE EIGHT (8) YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATION PERIOD IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH SECTION 78-12-22, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED. 
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, reads as follows: 
Within eight years: An action upon a judgment or 
decree of any court of the United States, or of 
any State or territory within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to be-
come due, for failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children. 
The past due installment payments for child support due and owing 
to the Respondent by the Appellant from April 15, 1959 to May of 
1966 were reduced to judgment on May 9, 1966 or within the eight 
year limitation period. Another judgment was entered against the 
Appellant on November 21, 1966 for additional child support arrea-
rages within the statutory limitation period set forth in Section 
78-12-22 of the Utah Code. The Appellant failed to pay child sup-
port payments between November 12, 1966 and December of 1969 whi~ 
resulted in the entry of a judgment of February 4, 1970 by the 
Honorable Emmett H. Brown. Judge Brown incorporated the judgments 
of May 9, 1966 and November 21, 1966 into his judgment of February 
4, 1970. A district judge has the authority and discretion to 
incorporate prior judgments for child support and alimony arrearages 
into a subsequent judgment. The judgment of February 4, 1970 
contained all child support arrearages from the date of the decree 
-5-
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of the divorce through December of 1969. All past due child 
support and alimony arrearages were reduced to judgment within 
a period of eight (8) years after the same became due in accor-
dance with Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The judgment of February 4, 1970 was properly renewed 
by the Respondent. She filed a complaint to renew the judgment of 
February 4, 1970 on March 15, 1977 and personally served the Appel-
lant with a copy of the complaint and summons on April 18, 1977. 
The Appellant failed to answer the Respondent's complaint within a 
period of twenty days and, as a result thereof, the Respondent 
took default judgment on July 6, 1977. The judgment of February 
4, 1970 was properly renewed within the eight year period of 
limitations in compliance with Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code. 
The eight year period of limitations upon a final judgment applies 
to past due unpaid installments under a divorce decree for alimony 
or support of minor children. Seeley v. Park, Utah 2d, 532 P.2d 
684 (1975). The Supreme Court of the State of California held 
that the revival of a judgment by motion resulted in the new 
judgment having the same force and effect as would an original 
judgment. Betty v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 18 Cal.2d., 
619, 116 P.2d 947 (1941). The Respondent has authority to renew her 
judgment every eight years in compliance with Section 78-12-22 of 
the Utah Code Annotated in order to preserve her rights to collect 
for child support and alimony arrearages in the future and, at a 
point in time, when the Appellant is solvent and she is in a 
position to collect the same. There is no statutory or common 
law prohibition in the State of Utah from the continuous renewal 
-6-
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of judgments each and every successive eight years as long 
as each judgment is properly renewed within the eight year 
statutory time period. 
A proceeding was brought in the State of Kansas to 
revive past due installment payments provided for by a divorce 
decree. The father answered and moved to set aside a previous 
order to revive. The district court overruled the father's 
motion and granted the mother's motion to revive; but the order 
of revivor did not include installments less than five years old. 
The father appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas. The Supreme 
Court held that the attack made by the father on the judgment 
entered was a collateral attack upon the judgment. The installme~ 
payments ripened into final judgment by becoming due and the 
judgment remained unpaid for more than seven years. The motion 
to revive such judgments during the seven year period immediately 
preceding revived such installments which had become dormant und~j 
the Kansas statute for a two-year period and also determined the 
amount due on unpaid payments for a five-year period immediately 
preceding the order. The total sum was included in the order 
and constituced a judgment. Riney v. Riney, 205 Kan. 671, 473 
P.2d 77 (1970). The Kansas Supreme Court held that a judgment 
which had been entered in a case and which has become final can-
not be collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceeding unless 
the judgment is void. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court of Kansas 
further held that a party may by the issuance of execution 
every five years, keep a judgment alive indefinitely. 
In Friesen v. Friesen, 196 Kan. 319, 410 P.2d 429 (19661 
-7-
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the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a district court decision to 
enter a judgment dated September 20, 1957, reviewing all child 
support payments due under a divorce decree from September 1, 
1950 to August 1, 1952. The district court, however, went 
further and included in the total judgment which it entered in 
favor of the plaintiff all unpaid child support payments under 
the order of the court in the divorce action which were due and 
owing for the immediate preceding five years. No appeal was 
taken, no exceptions were issued or anything further done with 
respect to this judgment until a subsequent motion on October 2, 
1963, was filed to revive the judgment of September 20, 1957. 
The appellant-father contended that the judgment was void to 
the extent that the court could not reduce a number of monthly 
judgments, not yet dormant, to a lump sum judgment. The Supreme 
Court held that when a judgment has been entered in a case and 
has become final, it cannot be collaterally attacked in a 
subsequent proceeding unless it appears the judgment is void. 
See also McFadden v. McFadden, 187 Kan., 398, 357 P.2d 751 (1960 ). 
In the case at bar, the prior 1966 judgments of Respondent were 
properly incorporated into the judgment of February 4, 1970. 
The Appellant is not in a position to collaterally attack the 
February 4, 1970 judgment and its renewal in 1977 as the original 
judgment of February 4, 1970 was valid and has full force and 
effect. 
The Appellant stipulated in open court before the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft as to the validity of the judgment of 
February 4, 1970 on February 17, 1976. He cannot now collaterally 
-8~ 
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attack the same judgment. A judgment which is rendered on 
a stipulation is conclusive of everything adjudicated by it, 
and it may not be collaterally attacked by a party to it. 
Klinker v. Klinker, 193 Cal.2d 687, 283 P.2d 83 (1955). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS SET FORTH NO AFFIR-
MATIVE DEFENSES TO JUSTIFY THE 
SETTING ASIDE OF THE RENEWED JUDG-
MENT DATED JULY 6, 1977 OBTAINED 
BY RESPONDENT. 
A dormant judgment may be revived and the obligation 
may be renewed by an independent suit thereon prosecuted prior to 
the time the judgment becomes dead. State ex. rel. Commissioners 
of Land Office v. Whitfield, 200 Okla., 300 193 P.2d 306 (1948). TI 
Respondent in the case at bar property renewed her judgment of 
February 4, 1970 by an independent suit filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court on March 15, 1977. The Appellant failed to answer 
to Respondent's complaint under the new action in Civil No. 
241218 or even under the original case file (Civil No. 117445). 
The Appellant, in fact, failed to respond to Respondent's 
complaint for a period of two and one half months, at which time, 
the Respondent took a default judgment on July 6, 1977. Despite 
the fact Respondent failed to serve the complaint and summons 
without the Civil No. on the face thereof, the Appellant failed 
to answer the complaint even under the original file number (Civil 
No. 117445). After the Appellant moved to set aside the default 
judgment of July 6, 1977, the Appellant submitted a proposed 
answer admitting the allegations of the complaint in Respondent"s 
complaint. 
_Q_ 
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The only defenses that can be made in a proceeding 
to revive a dormant judgment are the non-existence of the judgment, 
payment or satisfaction thereof, or invalidity thereof appearing 
on the face of the judgment roll. Shefts v. Oklahoma Co., 192 
Okla.483, 137 P.2d 589 (1943). The Oklahoma Supreme Court heard 
a matter on appeal dealing with the proceeding to revive a divorce 
action after the death of the husband following the entry of the 
divorce decree. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the 
proceedings were timely brought under a statute to revive the 
action upon the death of the judgment debtor: namely, the deceased 
husband. The general rule is that the only defenses available 
to an order of revivor are the non-existence of a judgment, sought 
to be revived, payment and satisfaction of such judgment, or in-
validity of judgment which is apparent on the face of the judgment 
roll. Whitman v. Whitman, (Okla.), 397 P.2d 664 (1964). It is 
clear that the Appellant can not argue the non-existence of the 
judgment. The judgment is clearly of record entered on February 
4,1970. The complaint filed on March 15, 1977 clearly sets forth 
the existence of the judgment of February 4, 1970 and that the 
Appellant has not paid or satisfied the same. There is no 
indication or allegation by the Appellant as to the invalidity 
on the face of the judgment entered on February 4, 1970 or of 
the default judgment entered on July 6, 1977. The Appellant had 
adequate time in which to answer the Respondent's complaint by 
a proper affirmative defense. The fact that the Appellant had 
not paid or satisfied the judgment of $11,705.00 did not give 
the Appellant a position of which to contest the entry of default 
-10-
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judgment which revived the initial judgment of February 4, 1970. 
Any defenses which the Appellant may have desired to have raised 
in May of 1966, November of 1966 or in February of 1970 should 
have been raised timely at those hearings. All of those matters 
are now at res judicata and were incorporated as part of the 
judgment of February 4, 1970. This judgment has now been properly 
revived in 1977 without affirmative defenses by the Appellant. 
POINT III 
THE FACT THAT NO CIVIL NUMBER WAS 
PUT ON THE FACE OF THE COMPLAINT 
FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF 
FEBRUARY 4, 1970 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
ANY ERROR TO JUSTIFY THE SETTING A-
SIDE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON JULY 
6, 1977. 
The Appellant argues that the Respondent attached 
the complaint and summons to an order to show cause proceeding. 
The Appellant fails to state the proper facts. The Appellant 
was personally served with the complaint and summons on April 
18, 1977 after the same had been filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court on March 15, 1977. It is true that the complaint 
and summons served on Appellant had no civil number on the face 
of the complaint and summons. The Appellant, however, failed to 
file any answer in either case number 117445, the original file, 
or 24128, the new file. Appellant was personally served with the 
copy of the complaint and summons and could have appropriately 
answered the allegations set forth in the Respondent's complaint. 
He, however, failed to respond to the Respondent's complaint re-
suiting in a default judgment on July 6, 1977. This permitted the 
-11-
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Appellant a period of two and one half months in which to answer 
the complaint if he had wanted to raise any affirmative defenses. 
There were, however, no affirmative defenses which could have been 
raised by the Appellant as pointed out in Point II of this Brief. 
The service of the complaint and summons without the Civil No. is 
merely a technical mistake and did not deprive the Appellant of his 
right to set forth affirmative defenses in a timely manner. The 
Arizona Court of Appeals held that the identity of a judgment sought 
to be renewed is capable of being ascertained from the face of the 
renewal affidavit and technical omissions or error in the affidavit 
would not defeat the renewal of the judgment. Weltsch v. O'Brien. 
25 Ariz. App. 50, 540 P.2d 1269 (1975). In this case the judgment 
creditor renewed his judgment be appropriate pleadings. The affi-
davit intended to effect the renewal of the judgment, which contained 
the names of parties to the judgment sought to be renewed, civil cause 
number of judgment, date of judgment and information as to where 
the judgment was recorded, sufficiently and was considered to have 
sufficiently identified the judgment sought to be renewed,despite 
the omission in the clerk's docket number and page number since 
the provision of the statute allowing the renewal of judgments bJ 
the affidavit indicate that either judgments which had been docketed 
or those which had been recorded could be renewed. The court held 
that the judgment renewal affidavit was not invalid for failing to 
list beneficial owners of the judgment sought to be renewed for 
such affidavit contained the name of the owner and the judgment 
for purposes of collection. The Supreme Court of Kansas in Riney 
v. Riney, 205 Kan., 671 473 P.2d 77 (1970) held that in matters 
-12-
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pertaining to the revivor of dormant judgments where there is 
no special reason for strict formality of procedure, the existence 
of irregularities does not render void the judicial process by 
which parties endeavor to maintain their rights. 
It is the Respondent's position in this case that there 
has been no error as a result of the absence of the civil number on 
the complaint and summons served upon the Appellant personally on 
April 18, 1977. The Appellant received complaint and summons 
which clearly stated the nature of the renewal of the prior 
judgment on its face. It was clear from the face of the pleading 
itself that the Appellant could have discovered that the purpose 
of the complaint was to revive the judgment of February 4, 1970. 
If the Appellant had wanted to raise any defenses, he could have 
filed an answer under the original action or the renewal action 
and mailed a copy to Respondent. The Appellant, however, filed no 
answer in either Civil No. 117445 or 241218. Respondent properly 
entered default judgment against the Appellant in Civil No. 241218, 
the revival action to renew the judgment of February 4, 1970. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent properly renewed the judgment of 
February 4, 1970 within the eight year period of limitations as 
set forth in Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code. The Appellant 
had adequate opportunity to raise any affirmative defenses against 
the renewal of this judgment. The Appellant did not, however, 
respond to the complaint of March 15, 1977. It is clear that the 
Appellant had no affirmative defenses in the form of the non-
-13-
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existence of the original judgment, payment or satisfaction 
thereof, or the invalidity appearing on the face of the judg-
ment roll. Therefore, the Appellant was in no position to 
raise any affirmative defenses against the renewal of the 
judgment of February 4, 1970. The district court had full 
discretion in incorporating the judgments in 1966 into the 
judgment of February 4, 1970. All of the judgments obtained 
by the Respondent against the Appellant were for past due in-
stallments which had accrued within a period of eight years 
prior to the time they became due and owing in accordance with 
Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code. Respondent has full authority 
to renew her judgment against the Appellant on a continous basis 
within a period of eight years in order to assure her the right 
of collection to which she is entitled. The absence of the civil 
number on the complaint and summons served upon the Appellant is 
merely a mistake and does not consititute error sufficient to 
set aside the default judgment of July 6, 1977. The Appellant 
had adequate opportunity to have filed an answer in either civil 
case, which he jid not elect to do. Therefore, Respondent respect-
fully requests this court to affirm the decision of Judge G. Hal 
Taylor of July 6, 1978 in denying the Appellant's motion to set 
aside default judgment. Respondent further requests the above-
entitled court to enter its finding that the judgment of July 6, 
1977 was the proper renewal of the judgment of February 4, 1970 in 
accordance with Section 78-12-22 of the Utah Code. 
-14-
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DATED this day of A~~ (} 
Respectfully submitted: 
READING, SNOW & HALLIDAY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
By U~~b 
· ?N SP~SNOW 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and 
' 1979 
exact copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent on the 
"31 s t ~ 1979, to Don L. Bybee, day of 
attorney for Appellant, 00 East, Salt Lake City, 
·Utah 84111. 
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